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Situation Awareness (SA) issues are often identified as contributing factors to drilling incidents, most recently in the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout. Two studies aimed to identify the cognitive components required for offshore drillers to develop and maintain 
SA whilst controlling subsea hydrocarbon wells. In study one, critical incident interviews were conducted with 18 experienced 
drilling personnel. Transcripts were subjected to thematic analysis, producing a framework of cognitive processes that enable 
drillers to build up an understanding of what is happening in the well bore and surrounding environment, predicting how the 
situation may develop. In the second study, analysis of 24 hours of observations (in-vivo and video) from a high fidelity well 
control simulator suggest behaviors such as monitoring and crew sharing information contribute to the drillers’ SA. The findings 





In April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico experienced a significant blowout 
which resulted in the death of 11 workers and the worst oil spill in US history. A few months previously, the West Atlas drilling 
rig on the Montara well, off the coast of Australia experienced a blowout which caused a substantial oil spill in the Timian Sea. 
In 2001, the largest semi-submersible rig at the time, the Petrobras P-36 sank, killing 11 men as a result of a series of explosions 
in the rig’s columns (USEPA, 2001). What links these incidents is that inaccurate situation awareness (SA) was cited as 
contributing to the events and resulting outcomes (Report to the President, 2011; Reader & O’Connor, 2014; Montara Report, 




A driller’s job requires complex precision engineering. The drill crew, including the driller, assistant driller and tool pusher are 
responsible for conducting the hazardous task of boring, constructing and maintaining a well, hundreds of feet below the drilling 
deck. They are frequently drilling into subsea hydrocarbon reserves which can be highly pressurised, at high temperatures, 
resulting in the wellbore having to be constantly counter-balanced to ensure that the flow of the volatile hydrocarbons is 
controlled. The driller’s accurate SA is vital to constantly monitor and comprehend the well state and the activities on the drill 
floor to be able to make the best decisions and keep accident risks to a minimum. Taking into consideration the increasing 
complexity of drilling, due to growing expansion into deep water as well as more sophisticated drilling software and technology, 
the importance of the drillers’ situation awareness will become ever more pertinent in the future. 
 
Situation Awareness in Offshore Drilling 
 
Despite its relevance for drilling activities, there is a limited body of work examining SA in this domain compared to other high-
risk, high-reliability occupations. The literature provides some insight into SA in the drilling environment and identifies 
influencing factors. SA has so far been investigated in the offshore drilling environment in the context of non-technical skills for 
well operations (Flin & Wilkinson, 2013) including training (Thorogood & Crichton, 2013) and incident command skills 
(Crichton, Lauche & Flin, 2005). Stanton and Wilson (2001) identified a number of issues associated with drillers’ SA, 
particularly in relation to concentration, poorly designed displays, problems with interpretation of information, inaccuracies in 
analysis and omitting to read monitor data. More specifically, Sneddon, Mearns and Flin (2006) investigated the role of SA for 
drilling crews through accident analysis and interviews. The results showed that 67% of SA errors investigated were classified 
as level 1 errors with the majority relating to failure to monitor or observe data, 20% of the errors related to problems with 
comprehension and mental models (level 2) and the remaining 13.3% of errors were associated with failures to anticipate (level 
3). Furthermore, isolation from events at home, fatigue and stress were perceived to be the main contributory factors for an 
individual’s reduced SA. In a later study Sneddon, Mearns and Flin (2013) developed the Work Situation Awareness (WSA) 
rating scale and found that higher levels of stress, sleep disruption and fatigue were significantly associated with lower levels of 
WSA, with stress being the strongest predictor. Lower WSA was related to more unsafe behaviour and increased work accidents. 
While this body of work provides preliminary insights into SA in this context, it does not give a full understanding of how drillers 






A method for identifying these cognitive processes is Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA). CTA uses a selection of techniques mainly 
interviews and observations, to understand how experts perform complex tasks through knowledge elicitation. This includes the 
explicit and implicit knowledge, cognitive processes and goal structures that underpin expertise (Militello & Hutton, 1998). 
Information gathered from CTA can be used to inform interventions such as systems design and training (e.g. Schaafstal, 
Schraagen & van Berl, 2000). These CTA methods have been applied in a wide range of high risk work domains including 
aviation (O’Hare, Wiggins, Williams & Wong, 1998), healthcare (e.g. Laparoscopy, Craig et al., 2012), and the military (Jenkins, 




The aim of this study was to identify the underlying cognitive components associated with offshore drillers’ development and 
maintenance of SA through critical incident interviews, observation and video analysis. These three forms of data can provide 
triangulation, increasing the reliability of the data (Angrosino, 2007). It is planned to feed this information into a future cognitive 
task analysis. 
 




Procedure. Phone interviews were conducted over a five month period (April-August 2013). Typically the interviewees were on 
a drilling rig or drill ship at sea at the time of the interview. With the permission of the interviewee, they were all audio recorded 
and transcribed for analysis. 
 
Interview Schedule. Flanagan’s (1954) critical incident method was adapted along with Endsley’s (1993) SA requirement 
analysis and Klein, Calderwood and Macgregor’s (1989) Critical Decision Method. The interview schedule was first piloted with 
a drilling expert. It consisted of two parts. First interviewees were asked a set of general questions about a driller’s SA and to 
briefly describe a well control incident that they had experienced. The interviewer then asked a set of probing questions about 
the event, such as what information did the crew ideally need to make a decision. 
 
Sample. The industrial supervisor of the sponsoring company invited potential drilling personnel to take part. Information about 
the project and the purpose of the interview was given beforehand. The researcher directly contacted those who had agreed to 
take part. Drilling personnel are a small, specialized population, working 12 hour shifts for between 2-4 weeks with no rest days. 
In total, 18 interviews were conducted with male drilling personnel from one company. All had direct experience in the drilling 
domain with a range of 5 to 25 years. The sample consisted of 11 drillers, two assistant drillers, one tool pusher, three senior tool 
pushers and one drilling superintendent. After 18 interviews, data saturation was reached (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Interviews were carried out by telephone, around shift patterns on rigs and drill ships at sea, and across international time zones. 
The average interview length was 28 minutes with a range of 24 minutes to 50 minutes. The total interview time was eight hours 
and 22 minutes. 
 
Data Analysis. Once transcribed, the interviews were analyzed using an adapted version of Braun & Clarke’s (2006) Thematic 
Analysis via the software program Nvivo 10 (QSR International, 2013). This is a structured method for identifying, analysing 
and reporting themes within the interview content to produce a richly detailed data set. This process followed a theory-driven, 
deductive method testing the application of Endsley’s (1995) model in this domain as well as other theories of SA such as 
Wicken’s (2002) spatial and task awareness in the initial analysis. 
A sample of five interview transcripts was cross-coded. The second coder was trained in using the coding scheme and basic 
drilling concepts. Cohen’s (1960) kappa coefficient was found to be acceptable (0.869) (Fleiss, 1981). The remaining transcripts 
were coded by the first author. 
 




Procedure. The first author conducted structured, non- participant observations of drill crews at a drilling simulator over a seven 
month period (February-August 2013). Scenarios lasted approximately 2.5 hours. Typically the scenarios involved the driller, 
assistant driller and tool pusher responding to challenging situations such as dealing with a kick and loss of well control. 
Structured observations were taken in the form of field notes with the aid of an observational checklist. These observations were 
taken from an observation room which had a number of video feeds from the simulator as well as the training instructors present. 




Sample. In total 13.5 hours of live observation was conducted at the simulator with 19 drill crew members involved. It was not 
possible to collect demographic information on the drill crews taking part, but the majority was male and most had at least several 
years of drilling experience. All of those taking part in the simulations gave written consent for the researcher to be present. 
 
Data Analysis. The field notes were written up in the form of analytic narratives shortly after the training. The video recordings 
were re-watched to review the simulation and to detect aspects which may have been initially missed or unclear. The narratives 
contained information on visible behaviors that appeared to be related to the drillers’ SA and what was happening with comments 
on influencing factors. It was not possible for a second observer to be present in the simulator, consequently no interrater 
agreement could be calculated. 
The analytic narratives were analyzed using Nvivo 10 (QSR International, 2013) and coded using the preliminary framework 








Preliminary findings from the ongoing observation and video analyses suggest that visible activities such as monitoring the 
developing situation through information gathering, as well as interactions with the surrounding crew, take up a considerable 
 
Procedure. Recordings of additional training simulations (taken over a six month period, May-October 2013) were provided to 
the researcher, extending the amount of observation time. The scenarios were principally the same as those in the observation 
study. Video analysis gives the researcher the opportunity to examine complex situations in rich detail that would not be possible 
with live observation (Mackenzie & Xiao, 2003). All participants in the recorded simulations had consented to having their 
videos analyzed. 
 
Sample. In total, 10.5 hours of video recordings of 14 drill crew members were analysed. The researcher produced time lines for 
each video recording, watching them repeatedly. Key sections from the time lines were then selected to be analyzed, as is 
common in video analysis (McNeese, 2004). These selected sections were chosen based on criteria taken from the critical incident 
interviews e.g. aspects of well control. 
 
Data Analysis. In total 25 key sections were selected from all of the videos which ranged in length from 3 to 12 minutes, with 
an average length of 7 minutes. The video sections were analysed using Nvivo 10 (QSR International, 2013) and coded using 
the preliminary framework developed from the critical incident interviews. 
A sample of six video sections was cross-coded. The second coder was trained in using the framework, software and basic 
drilling concepts. Cohen’s (1960) kappa coefficient was found to be acceptable (0.857) (Fleiss, 1981). The remaining video 




In total 16 themes were identified during the interview analysis with 10 cognitive components associated with drillers developing 
and maintaining SA during complex tasks including well control (six at level 1 SA, three at level 2 SA and one at level 3 SA) 
and six influencing factors. In the main these themes reflected the components defined by Endsley (1995). The total number of 
times the theme was mentioned in the interviews and illustrative quotes are shown in Table 1. 
 
Attending to the situation, monitoring and cue recognition of changes/indicators in the drilling parameters were the most 
frequently identified perceptive skills from the interview transcripts, suggesting that these are important for the driller to 
successfully do this job (Level 1 SA). Sharing information and awareness between the driller and the rest of the drill crew was 
also found to be critical in the interpretation of the situation (Level 2 SA). Whilst anticipation was not mentioned as frequently, 
it is associated with better, more experienced drillers (Level 3 SA). A number of factors that influence SA were identified with 
the most frequently mentioned being distraction and experience. 
Preliminary findings from the ongoing observation and video analyses suggest that visible activities such as monitoring the 
developing situation through information gathering, as well as interactions with the surrounding crew, take up a considerable 
amount of the drillers’ time and cognitive resources. Sharing of information between crew members through discussion in the 
drill cabin and phone calls makes a substantial contribution to the driller’s comprehension and subsequent awareness of the 
situation. It was observed that a more coordinated, supportive crew would aid the driller’s awareness particularly during 
challenging situations. Similarly, the assistant driller and tool pusher could positively impact on the influence of distracters, 
stress and workload, by alleviating their cognitive effect on the driller (e.g. the AD screening calls whilst the driller was busy). 
 
Drillers who anticipated how the situation may develop and who took action to prepare for that (e.g. doing calculations, making 




Critical incident interviews, observation and video analysis data were used to develop a preliminary framework of the cognitive 
components associated with offshore drillers’ developing and maintaining SA during well control. Cognitive processes could be 
identified that support situation awareness at each of the three stages defined by Endsley (1995). The preliminary observation 
and video analysis findings support and complement those found in the interviews and will be further discussed at the conference. 
 
The perceptual skills of attending to and monitoring the situation, gathering information, and cue recognition of changes, in the 
drilling parameters were identified as most important for the driller to successfully do his or her job. Implicit recognition and 
processing of information was also identified in which drillers felt a sense of unease in response to unconscious processing of 
information or implicit recognition of cues which lead them to take action. It is likely that this cognitive component is associated 
with Klein’s (1993) Recognition Primed Decision Making, as well as the more recent concept of chronic unease (Fruhen, Flin 
& McLeod, 2013). 
 
Comprehension of gathered information was found to be achieved in collaboration with mental models, expectations and 
experience, as well as sharing of information and awareness between the crew. These crew behaviors suggest a close relationship 
between individual driller’s SA and the drill crew (team) SA (e.g. Stanton, Salmon, Walker & Jenkins, 2009). Mental models 
were found to consist of complex, dynamic mental representations of situational aspects. How the situation may progress was 
anticipated through mental visualizations based on which action can be prepared. Just as in other high risk, high reliability 
domains such as aviation (Endsley & Garland, 2000), it is this anticipatory skill that defines an experienced, if not yet expert, 
driller and is a skill that is looked for when considering promotion. 
 
The findings also reflect those found in other high-risk, high reliability domains in which SA has been researched. This suggests 
that these cognitive processes are not specific to a single domain or task. SA research in areas including health care (e.g. Koch 
et al., 2012) and nuclear power control operators (Lee, Park, Kim & Seong, 2012) identify similar cognitive components required 
for developing and maintaining SA. For example, Partick, James, Ahmed and Halliday (2006) identified very similar cognitive 
skills to the drillers, required for nuclear control team operators including anticipation, knowing what everyone has to do, 
identifying the significance of cues and monitoring. The characteristic of being able to anticipate and project how the situation 
may develop is associated with expertise not only in drilling but also in aviation and surgery (Lini, Vallespir, Hourlier, Labat & 
Favier, 2013; Wauben et al., 2011). 
 
Six influencing factors were indentified with the potential to aid and hinder SA including distraction, experience, expectation, 
coping with stressful or demanding situations, system and design features and workload. Experience and expectations could lead 
to faster cue recognition, more efficient monitoring and more accurate mental models but could result in confirmation bias and 
complacency. Distraction could pull attention away from the main task, losing focus but in some instances could re-focus 
attention when the driller had become fixated. 
 
Our analysis of cognitive components involved in drillers’ SA provides an initial insight into how SA is developed and 
maintained by this group, and indicates Endsley’s (1995) model to be applicable to this domain. The current study echoes 
Sneddon et al.’s (2006) findings as the majority of cognitive components occurred at the perceptive level, consequently it would 
be expected that there would be a higher level of error associated with them. For example, drillers can experience difficulties 
concentrating on the prioritised task when distracted. The interview study also found that problems at home (incorporated in 
distraction) and stress were reported as negatively impacting on SA but fatigue was not commonly mentioned by the drillers. 
 
The limitations associated with the current study are as follows. Interviews allow a certain degree of introspection form 
participants, but it is questionable to what extent an individual can be aware and comment on their own cognitive processes and 
SA. In addition, interviews are self-report and can be subject to bias as well as motivational agendas (Rowley, 2012). 
Furthermore, conducting phone interviews may reduce the rapport that can be built up during an interview but, on the other hand, 
this more anonymous, confidential method may have advantageous in terms of interviewee candor and openness. To give the 
fullest picture of drillers’ SA observation and video analysis were aimed at evaluating the convergent validity of the data through 
triangulation. Furthermore, these methods’ strengths and weaknesses should counterbalance and complement each other. The 




In conclusion, the results provide a preliminary insight into how SA is developed and maintained by drillers. Endsley’s (1995) 
three level model was applied to a new industry, adding to the current body of research. In the wider context, these findings 
illustrate the importance of SA for safety and performance in drilling. With regard to non-technical/crew resource management 
 
training in drilling, (e.g. OGP, 2014) the identified cognitive components could be utilized to further refine these training 
programs. Once further developed, the framework could be applied to system design recommendations such as informing the 




This article is based on a doctoral research project which is sponsored by an international drilling rig operator. The views 
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Table 1. The themes identified from the interview transcripts and the associated number of times they occurred in the interviews with 
illustrative quotes plus interviewee number. 
Theme Total No. of Quotes 
 times coded  
 across  
 interviews  
Level 1 SA   
Attention 52 So you kind of have to zone in and block out certain things you don’t need to know about. (I2) 
Implicit Recognition & 15 If he feels something is not right he shouldn’t do it. (I17) 
Processing   
Cue Recognition 50 You’ve got total volume, if that changes at all, there’s something happening down hole and you can usually pick it 
  up.(I18) 
Monitoring 74 An ideal driller has to find the ideal way to keep a track of all of these things.(I6) 
Gathering Information 39 It’s a combination of him collecting it. There is a series of questions and also some of that information being given to him. 
  So a good driller is a guy that asks a lot of questions. (I13) 
Level 2 SA   
Comprehension & 33 The well is sending all kinds of signals up which you need to interpret and I’m the first one who looks at them.(I14) 
Understanding   
Mental Models 46 You can’t do the job unless you have that mental picture because you wouldn’t really know what you are doing.(I15) 
Shared Information & 73 Someone that is open to all of the information on the rig and knows then how to distribute it when he sees it. I don’t need 
Awareness  someone that is there and takes in all the information and then doesn’t share it. (I9) 
Level 3 SA   
Anticipating & 26 Your better drillers will look ahead at least two steps and know what is coming up in the future. (I9) 
Projecting   
Awareness of the 47 He has to be aware of what’s going on round about him. The driller, he can make the difference between a disaster and 
Situation  being hurt. (I18) 
Influencing Factors   
Distraction 40 The fact that there is always a million things going on ... and it is very easy to become distracted. (I4) 
Experience 51 I might react faster to stuff by just because maybe I have been exposed more to it. (I12) 
Expectations 22 We have a pre-tour meeting 50 minutes before I go on shift where we discuss with the crew and people around us, telling 
  us what the next coming 12 hours, what’s been happening during the day and what’s the next operations. (I3) 
Stress 36 So it can get overwhelming if you let it but I have grown to not let it get overwhelming. There are ways of coping. (I2) 
System & Design 19 These rigs are so automated now the driller is expected to know and do a lot more now than he has in days past. (I13) 
Workload 13 When you’re sat in the chair for maybe two hours and you are processing all this information, it’s nice to get relief. (I2) 
 
